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On Stories Within 
and Stories Behind 
Symptoms: Response 
to Colombetti and 
Stein
Gerrit Glas
I thank Giovanna Colombetti and Dan Stein for their careful reading and thoughtful comments.
Colombetti is right when she suggests that in 
enactivism there are no ‘mere physiological states.’ 
She criticizes the following quotation: “If there 
is no self-referentiality, even after attempts at 
clarification, the putative emotion is just a physi-
ological state or a sensation.” My formulation, she 
says, echoes traditional, disembodied cognitivist 
accounts of emotion, according to which bodily 
arousal and bodily sensation, without accompa-
nying intentional evaluations and judgments, are 
mere physiological happenings. Enactivism rejects 
the dichotomy between cognitive appraisals and 
bodily arousal.
I agree that I could (and probably should) have 
formulated more carefully. I endorse most of the 
assumptions on which the enactivist approach 
is based. I reject the dichotomy Colombetti ad-
dresses. My concerns about enactivism regard its 
underlying metaphysics (which is not the topic 
of the article) and its presumed promises for the 
empirical study of emotion (which might be more 
difficult to fulfill than proponents are inclined to 
suggest). But I have never doubted the importance 
and the power of its arguments against dualist 
accounts of psychological phenomena.
My somewhat ambiguous formulations with 
respect to ‘pure’ or ‘mere’ physiological states 
reflect my carefulness not to pretend too much 
by claiming that just as in the case of emotions 
(‘mere’) physiological states signify something 
about the person having them. Emotions are 
after all not just physiological states. I agree that 
(‘mere’) physiological states embody certain in-
terests of the organism. But does this also mean 
that such physiological states “reveal something 
about what the organism cares about?” The dif-
ference between these two formulations is subtle, 
but relevant. Can organisms like bacteria care 
about themselves? And if so, do they do this in 
the same way as humans do? Or do bacteria only 
metaphorically take care of themselves? I find these 
questions difficult to answer. Even if we granted 
that it is possible to say, without logical or gram-
matical error, that a bacterium takes care of itself 
by orienting itself to a sugar gradient, would that 
imply that we can say (with Colombetti) that 
the bacterium’s “swimming up [against] a sugar 
gradient reveals that it evaluates sugar as good 
for its survival?” Do bacteria evaluate? Such 
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anthropomorphisms are useful and legitimate 
when scientific findings are ‘translated’ to lay-
contexts; they are probably harmless in a scientific 
context (because scientists know better); but they 
are not harmless and should concern us when 
we try to make philosophical sense of empirical 
findings.
In the article I try to develop a vocabulary that 
allows psychopathological phenomena, such as 
disturbed moods and emotions, to be understood 
as signifying something about the person, even if 
the person having these emotions and moods is not 
aware of this. The non-transparency of the emo-
tion (or mood) is, in other words, not an argument 
against its self-signifying potential. These non-
transparent emotions and moods differ from self-
conscious emotions and moods, on the one hand, 
and from ‘mere’ physiological states on the other 
hand. They differ from the self-conscious emo-
tions/moods in that their subjects lack awareness 
of self-signifying meanings; and they differ from 
physiological states in that they signify something 
about who I am. Physiological states do not or do 
not in the same way signify something about me 
qua person. They mean and indicate something 
about me qua organism. They give indications 
about my needs, drives, and interests. They may 
be viewed as the embodiment of my drives, needs 
and interests. But this ‘self-signification’ never-
theless differs from the self-signifying capacity of 
emotions.
My formulations show that I am still somewhat 
uncertain about how to phrase distinctions like 
these. I am inclined to see the difference between 
the self-signifying qualities of emotions and 
physiological states as one of gradation. There 
are situations in which emotions and physiologi-
cal states overlap, for instance cases in which the 
emotion (panic, for instance) amounts to a storm 
of physical sensations; or cases in which physi-
ological states are so indicative of the condition 
of the organism that they are difficult to discern 
from basic emotions. But this overlap does not 
imply that the distinction between emotion and 
physiological states has no validity at all or that 
physiological states signify in a similar way as 
emotions. Ricoeur would possibly say that (‘mere’) 
physiological states reveal something about the 
‘what,’ about what condition I am in, not about 
who I am. However, phrasing the distinction in this 
way would sound somewhat dualistic and rigid, 
even to me. Maybe it is better to conceptualize 
the distinction as gradual. Physiological states 
would then ‘self-signify’ content related to me as a 
physiological organism, whereas non-transparent 
emotions ‘self-signify’ about higher order mean-
ings that pertain to me as a person.
One of the reasons for proceeding somewhat 
sparingly when attributing self-signifying qualities 
to physiological states is the long, disturbed history 
of psychosomatic medicine. In the psychosomatic 
tradition of the 1950s and 1960s physiological 
ailments were thought to mean something and to 
indicate something meaningful about the patient. 
Low back pain was thought to reflect that the 
patient could not bear the weight of life; vomiting 
and gastric problems were assumed to symboli-
cally refer to the patient’s refusal to ‘swallow’ some 
disappointing life event, and so on. Psychological 
meaning was projected into ‘mere’ bodily phenom-
ena. History has shown that the therapeutic gain 
of this approach was low. There is even today a 
legitimate and fruitful tradition of psychosomatic 
medicine, but this tradition has become much 
more careful with respect to the attribution of 
psychological meaning to physiological symptoms. 
There may be a story ‘behind’ the symptoms, but 
not always ‘within’ the symptoms.
This history of psychosomatic medicine is one 
of the other reasons that I am hesitant to adopt 
a too inclusive notion of self-referentiality. Self-
referentiality can only be attributed to phenomena 
which possess immediate self-revelatory capacities; 
phenomena, in other words, with a story ‘within’ 
(instead of behind) the symptoms. Saying that 
“embodying an interest” can best be seen as an 
“empirical approximation” of self-referentiality 
is a somewhat obscure formulation of this point. 
What it meant to suggest is that the ‘behind’ may 
approximate the ‘within’; but that the two will 
probably never completely overlap. This, in turn, 
is also caused by differences in epistemic strategy. 
The hypothesis that physiological states, like 
emotions, embody certain interests has been de-
veloped by empirically oriented psychologists (like 
Frijda). Empirical sciences tend to adopt a third 
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person, objective stance, and do not investigate 
their explananda from within. Self-signification 
and self-referentiality are terms that were coined 
by Continental hermeneutic philosophers. These 
philosophers are interested in the intrinsic mean-
ing of the phenomena they investigate. With this, 
we are back at the point at which we started; but 
enriched and more aware of both the difficulties 
and the opportunities of attempts to ‘integrate’ 
philosophical analysis and empirical investigation.
Dan Stein’s comments also circle around this 
idea of integration. I agree with most of what he 
says, especially his conclusion that “it may well 
be that findings in psychiatric science ultimately 
influence the way in which we think about enac-
tivism.” The interaction between philosophy and 
empirical science should indeed develop in two 
directions. It is interesting to see how Stein’s inter-
est in the work of Lakoff and Johnson influences 
his appreciation of the enactivist tradition. Meta-
phors, he says, help us to conceptualize mental 
processes. Scientific language cannot do without 
metaphors either, but that is not something to 
deplore. Metaphors support scientific intuition 
and they help to open up and direct the scientist’s 
mind. From here, one can indeed understand why 
it would be so worthwhile to compare recent work 
on anxiety (Stein mentions LeDoux and Pine as 
well as Fox and Kalin) with enactivist interpreta-
tions of the same phenomena. Metaphors may 
help us bridge the gaps between science, clinical 
practice, and every day lay understanding of psy-
chopathological phenomena; but they may also 
hide underlying tensions and ambiguities. Careful 
cross-disciplinary informed analysis of the claims 
and hidden tensions in these attempts to approxi-
mation will prove to be one of the important keys 
for a flourishing future psychiatry.
References
Colombetti, G. (2020). Embodied self-referentiality. 
Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology, 27 (1), 51–52.
Glas, G. (2020). An enactive approach to anxiety and 
anxiety disorders. Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychol-
ogy, 27 (1), 35–50.
Stein, D. J. (2020). Cognitive embodiment and anxiety 
disorders. Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology, 27 
(1), 53–55.
